Fishermen and Supervisory Instances on the Ob’ River: Law Enforcement in the Shadow of Local Rules of the Game

Abstract

This article presents a detailed analysis of various ways of informal private environmental managementat fisheries in the context of control practices by representatives of the local executive power. In thelight of uncovered strategies by which inspectors construct instances of “reference offense” and thusstigmatize potential violators, as well as of techniques of conspiracy and play based on mutual mythologization, one can argue that a new field of interactions is being formed. But this interaction is organized not according to the logic of confrontation and resistance to the state. The community as asignificant agent changes the balance of power relations and embeds the partnership with entities exercising control on behalf of the state within the system of exchange, services, and mutual obligations. Drawing on the micro-anthropological analysis of situational actions, rhetorical practices, and narratives, I examine the complex structure based on the alternation of processes of creation and termina-tion of temporary alliances.